A means of attaining richer, more comprehensive forms of software diversity on a mass scale is proposed through leveraging and repurposing a closely related, yet heretofore untapped, line of computer science research-automatic program synthesis. It is argued that the search-based methodologies presently used for obtaining implementations from specifications can be broadened relatively easily to a search for many candidate solutions, potentially diversifying the software monoculture. Small-scale experiments using the Rosette synthesis tool o↵er preliminary support for this proposed approach. But the possible rewards are not without danger: It is argued that the same approach can power a dangerous new level of sophistication for malware mutation and reactively adaptive software threats.
INTRODUCTION
For almost a quarter century-since Cohen's seminal 1993 article on program evolution [13] -the brittleness of software monoculture has been recognized by the computer security community as a major root of cyber insecurity. In contrast to most biological systems, whose chaotic diversity engenders communal resilience against many threats, such as disease, environmental change, or species introduction; software systems tend towards uniformity, championing ideals such as code reuse, computation replication, and resource sharing. Attacks that succeed against one of these shared elements therefore Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
NSPW '16 September 26-29, 2016 , Granby, CO, USA too often succeed against the entire community, threatening to eradicate entire software species in a single blow.
Cohen recognized the value of diversity in part because he had already observed its value for cyber o↵ense. His 1986 dissertation [12] prophetically observes that viral evolution ultimately dooms static approaches to antivirus detection due to the limits of computability (a verdict that the antivirus industry recently recapitulated 28 years later under the mantra "antivirus is dead" [80] ). Thus, like competing biological communities, the most diverse software community tends to have the greatest survivability.
Over the following decades, scientists responded to these observations by advocating what might be termed artificial micro-diversity-the perturbation and randomization of low-level computer code to produce syntactically di↵erent but semantically equivalent code. For example, Forrest's influential 1997 paper [19] promoted dead code introduction, basic block reordering, and memory layout randomization as promising implementation strategies for defensive diversity. Such perturbations can probabilistically defeat many low-level exploits, such as bu↵er overflows, and have the advantage of being potentially applicable to existing software products without requiring redevelopment.
But large classes of attacks remain immune to microdiversity. For example, cross-site scripting (XSS)-one of the historically largest software vulnerability classes-is generally attributable to a failure to suitably sanitize untrusted inputs flowing to trusted sinks. Any diversification strategy that diligently preserves program semantics is likely to preserve the sanitization lapse, 1 leading once again to universal vulnerability of the community. Thus, true software diversity remains an elusive challenge in many respects.
Concurrently and largely independently, the programming languages and compilers community has devoted a large body of research to a di↵erent but closely related problem: automatic program synthesis. Synthesis work is motivated by the observation that humans tend to be much better at describing what computer programs should do than writing e cient and correct computer programs that do it. The goal of synthesis is therefore typically defined as, "the systematic derivation of a program from a given specification" [48] (cf., [47] ).
In this paper, we propose retargeting advances in program synthesis to the artificial diversity problem by broadening this goal to "the systematic derivation of a diversity of programs from a given specification." All synthesis research is rooted in search (because there are generally an infini-tude of programs that satisfy any given specification), so broadening the search to multiple programs seems both natural and potentially feasible. Synthesis algorithms tend to discard "poor" (e.g., less e cient but still correct) search candidates as probably undesirable to users; but from a diversity standpoint, the synthesist's dross may be the defender's silver. In particular, we consider whether a broadened form of program synthesis may be a feasible avenue toward more macro-diverse software communities. Dually, we consider program synthesis as a potentially dangerous methodology for aggressively metamorphic malware o↵ense.
Toward exploring these questions, we survey pertinent research on program synthesis and artificial diversity, and conduct some preliminary experiments on marrying these heretofore disparate technologies. The outcomes of these experiments suggest that diversity is obtainable via program synthesis and has the potential to replace or outperform existing diversity techniques currently in use.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we motivate the need for program diversity for both defensive and o↵ensive security by examining recently published surveys of the literature [3, 39] . Section 3 correspondingly draws upon surveys of the program synthesis literature [22] to summarize modern synthesis methods and common applications. Section 4 describes our initial attempts at attaining program diversity using synthesis. Section 5 outlines discussions that occurred at NSPW. Section 6 proposes future work in this area. Section 7 concludes.
ARTIFICIAL DIVERSITY
Artificial diversity refers to the creation of semantically equivalent but syntactically di↵erent variants of a given program for security and reliability purposes. The idea was initially proposed over two decades ago [13] as a means of fault-tolerance for mission critical systems. It easy to see how nature inspires such a proposal. Biological diversity ensures population-wide resilience against a specific disease or virus, and forms a critical factor in the survivability of a species (and even the ecosystem as a whole) [30, 46, 50] .
Although the term "diversity" has traditionally been applied to defense, we show later in this section that some popular methods employed by malware to evade detection are conceptually identical to defensive diversity.
Our focus here is on examining diversity techniques and methodologies; for a broader discussion of the motivations of diversity in the context of full system design, we refer the reader to related works [5, 6, 60, 70, 73] .
Defensive Diversity
Software (and hardware) is often intentionally engineered to be homogenous. Homogeneity simplifies the e↵ort involved in developing, distributing, maintaining, and updating a product, making it the commercially advantageous choice.
However, this homogeneity also lowers the bar for exploitation. Malicious actors who obtain and analyze any instance of a product derive conclusions that reliably apply to all instances. Vulnerabilities they find can be therefore be developed into exploits that threaten all copies of the product.
Defensive software diversity aims to introduce uncertainty between di↵erent versions of a software product, requiring attackers to obtain precise knowledge of the target versions they wish to exploit. This means that a vulnerability found in one instance of the product does not necessarily exist in other copies, forcing attackers to tailor exploits to the specific copy of the product they wish to target. This significantly raises the bar for both targeted and mass scale attacks.
Various types of diversity have been proposed that operate at di↵erent granularities 2 and at di↵erent points in the software development and deployment lifecycle. 3 Larsen et al. [39] categorize di↵erent diversity schemes based on the level at which they operate, as well as when in the lifecycle they are utilized. A partial, abbreviated listing of these is given below.
Diversity by Level
1. Instruction level approaches attempt to replace instructions or instruction sequences with semantically equivalent, but di↵erent instructions (or instruction sequences). Alternately, some approaches also limit themselves to reordering existing instructions or instruction sequences.
2. Basic block level approaches to diversity typically permute the order of basic blocks [79] , or obfuscate the control flow graph [14, 44] . Diversity at this stage is a costly process, and thus not widely adopted. It is most often used as a means of introducing fault-tolerance [1, 62] in select domains like aerospace, where reliability is a critical concern.
2. Compilation and linking stage techniques are largely automatic, and proposed more for security than for fault-tolerance. Compilation-based approaches rely on one or more compiler passes that perform the actual diversification, while linking-based approaches take advantage of debugging information from the compiler's output to perform diversification just before linking separately compiled modules.
3. Post-installation approaches statically rewrite binary programs after they are installed, but before they are executed. For the most part, this rewriting does not perform the actual diversification, but instead prepares the binary to be diversified when it is loaded. Postinstallation approaches tend to focus mainly on randomizing the relative locations of instructions [26] or basic-blocks [79] , and do not attempt to replace instruction sequences with semantically equivalent substitutes.
4. Load-time approaches modify the in-memory representation of a process before it is executed. Some of these tend to be secondary stages of post-installation approaches, but there also exist purely load-time diversification techniques [17] .
In general, we observe that implementation and design level techniques tend to produce changes at the highest conceptual levels-at a whole program or algorithmic level-while the remaining pre-and post-installation based approaches tend to work between the instruction and function levels. This is o↵set by the increased cost and di culty of scaling this approach.
Additionally, most automated approaches focus on permuting or randomizing code positions at di↵erent granularitiesfrom individual instructions to entire functions. Fewer techniques attempt instruction (or instruction sequence) replacement.
Offensive Diversity
Program diversity is not just useful as a defensive technique; it is one of the fundamental methods employed by malware to evade detection.
End-user detection for malware tends to rely heavily on various forms of static and syntactic analysis, in addition to dynamic monitoring, because of the higher costs associated with dynamic and behavioral analysis [37, 38, 43, 56, 67] . This is reflected in the evasion techniques employed by malware, which can be broadly split into the following categories:
1. Oligomorphic malware uses simple invertible instructions, such as exclusive-or, to transform malicious code bytes and hide distinguishing syntactic features. Before the code executes, the original contents are recovered by applying the inverse transformation to the obfuscated payload.
2.
Polymorphism is an evolution of the idea behind oligomorphy. In lieu of simple operations, polymorphic malware encrypts the payload, or applies a similarly one-way function, leaving only a small decryption routine behind. When the malware is loaded, the decryption routine unpacks the payload and transfers control to it.
3. Virtualization-based obfuscation expresses payloads in terms of a bytecode language tailored for a custom embedded virtual machine (VM). The VM executes the payload by interpreting the bytecode at runtime. By mutating the bytecode language (and the VM) on each propagation, a high degree of diversity can be maintained.
4.
Metamorphic malware replaces malicious code sequences with semantically identical code during propagation.
It accomplishes this using a metamorphic engine that introspects its own binary programming and performs modification passes. These passes replace instruction sequences with structurally di↵erent but semantically equivalent sequences, resulting in high diversity without the telltale entropy produced by polymorphism, or the potentially distinguishing VM of virtualization-based malware.
As evident from their descriptions, oligomorphic and polymorphic malware obfuscate themselves by hiding the contents of the payload from analyses syntactically, while malware that employs virtualization-based obfuscation or metamorphism aims to thwart detection using a more semantic style of diversity.
Of these approaches, metamorphism is potentially the hardest to detect. Oligomorphic and polymorphically encoded payloads exhibit identifiable statistical properties, such as entropy [45] and byte frequency [77, 78] , that are unique from most benign code, and which can be used to detect such malware in the wild. Virtualization based obfuscation e↵ectively shifts the malware's obfuscation burden to hiding the in-lined, custom VM, and therefore has the potential to be statically detectable using carefully selected heuristics that exploit this weakness.
Because metamorphism introduces mutations by replacing code sequences with equivalent plaintext code, it does not typically exhibit statistical properties that distinguish it from non-encrypted benign software. Additionally, there are no complicated interpreters or JIT-compilers in-lined into metamorphic malware, allowing it to bypass heuristics that would detect VM-based approaches.
Most metamorphic engines use a bottom-up approach that consists of disassembling native code to some intermediate representation, adding diversity by modifying the intermediate code in functionally equivalent ways, and finally converting it back into (now mutated) native code. They generally perform some combination of the following five phases to introduce diversity [58]:
1. Garbage insertion adds unreachable code to the original code.
2. Code substitution replaces instructions or instruction sequences with semantically identical versions.
3. Code insertion adds dead ine↵ectual code in between the actual malicious payload.
Register swapping reallocates the registers that instructions use.
5. Control flow scrambling uses branch instructions to reorder basic blocks or functions.
Interestingly, we observe that many of these techniques are identical to the instruction level, basic-block level and function level transformations used for defensive diversity. O↵ensive research has also explored the merits of a topdown approach to malware obfuscation, as demonstrated by the Frankenstein system [54] . Frankenstein starts with a high-level representation of the payload logic, concealed within its data sections. When deployed on a target system, it disassembles benign binaries and constructs a database of gadgets-instruction sequences that perform useful semantic tasks-and uses the process of unification from logic programming to find a sequence of gadgets that is semantically equivalent to the high-level payload description. The use of unification imbues Frankenstein with the ability to generate mutants that more closely exhibit the statistical properties of benign binaries unique to a given victim machine or network.
A comparison of defensive versus o↵ensive diversification strategies reveals at least two major di↵erences between the two: First, o↵ensive diversity is more likely to trigger at propagation time than at any of the stages described in Section 2.1. This makes sense given that the primary purpose of diversity for malware is to evade static detection during transit and at rest, while the motivation for defensive diversity is to eliminate common vulnerabilities or exploitation paths.
Second, the adoption of defensive diversity techniques is far more constrained by factors such as runtime performance and maintainability, which are not as high priorities for many malware authors. For example, most malware can a↵ord to run with higher overhead if it means increased stealth. These di↵erences influence how and what kinds of program synthesis can be used for both purposes.
PROGRAM SYNTHESIS
Program synthesis [2, 4, 8, 16, 22-24, 27, 29, 31-34, 40-42, 47-49, 52, 61, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76] tackles the problem of systematically deriving or discovering a program from a specification [22, 47, 48] . The synthesized program therefore has some formal guarantee of correctness with respect to the given specification; however, specifications are usually incomplete from a security perspective. For example, a specification for a string sorting computation would typically prescribe orderedness of output and one-to-one correspondance of input to output elements, but would not typically enumerate all standard library functions that have vulnerabilities, and that therefore must not be employed in any synthesized implementation. This is especially the case if some vulnerabilities are as yet unknown to defenders. Hence, synthesis does not guarantee security even if the synthesis algorithm is correct.
While compilers and other translators play an important role in the synthesis problem space, a distinguishing characteristic of synthesis over compiler construction is the former's heavy reliance on search techniques to find solutions. These searches can wander farther afield from the programmer's original input specification than traditional syntax-directed compilation, allowing specifications to be less comprehensive than traditional source code programs, and leading to solutions farther removed from specfications than object code is removed from source code. It can also provide new algorithmic insights in the search results [22] .
Program synthesis' goal of producing a singular program seems to be prevalent throughout the history of the literature. For this work, we propose generalizing the goal of generating "a program" to generating "a diversity of programs". By so doing, we hope to capitalize on the capacity of search to explore a much larger and more diverse space of solutions than traditional compilers. We feel this could potentially o↵er great benefits to cyber security, toward more e↵ective artificial diversity for cyber defense, and more potent software polymorphism for cyber o↵ense.
Synthesis Methods and Applications
Gulwani [22] separates program synthesis methods into three dimensions: user intent (i.e., the format of the input specification), search space, and search technique.
Input specifications are often based on logic (e.g., [23, 29, 48, 61, 72] ) or proofs (e.g., [47] ). Other common choices are natural language [24, 42, 61] , which can be converted via natural language processing into a logical specification; example inputs and outputs [2, 41, 52] , including program traces [4, 16, 40] ; and example programs or reference implementations, as in the case of sketching (discussed in Section 3.2) and synthesizing program inverses [71] .
Of these, we speculate that program traces and program sketching are perhaps the most promising and relevant approaches for security applications. Traces have natural links to security because security policies are often specified in terms of valid program traces [9] . Alternatively, program sketches more closely resemble traditional computer programs, and might therefore be a more feasible approach to diversifying existing code. Our preliminary experiments reported in Section 4 therefore adopt a sketching approach.
A synthesis engine typically converts a given input specification into constraints for some search method, which is then applied to find a result program from the search space. Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers and satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers are standard vehicles for search, but many other search algorithms are also used (e.g., A* goal directed search, version space algebras [2, 41, 52] , or brute force search [8, 34, 49, 52] ). SAT/SMT solvers are sometimes combined with other search algorithms.
Program Sketching
Of the aspects of synthesis systems mentioned in Section 3.1, the most important to the user of the system is the choice of input specification. In addition to being su ciently general (many synthesis systems are domain specific), for our experiments we wanted a system whose input specification was easy to work with and allowed control over how much of the program to synthesize. In particular, we wanted the ability to influence whether and how much loops and other control flow constructs are synthesized, since these are often harder for synthesis engines to handle.
Toward this end, we focused on systems that take a program sketch [27, 31, 68, 69, 75] as input. A program sketch is a program with holes to be filled in by the synthesis system. The sketch both constrains the search space to those programs that match the sketch, and also provides a correctness specification in the form of assertions defining correct program behavior. Assertions and holes can then be converted into an integer constraint problem to be solved by an SMT solver.
For example, consider the code listed below (from [68] , written in the SKETCH language). The program contains an integer hole, denoted by '??'. The assertion formally specifies the desired behavior of the program.
void main(int x){ int y = x * ??; assert y == x + x; } Synthesis is performed by converting holes into parameters of the program, and then partially evaluating the sketch using the results from the solver as static inputs, which fill in the holes. No assertions may fail for any input to the program. The synthesized result of the example above is identical to the input sketch, but with the hole replaced with the constant '2'. In this case there is only one solution, but in general there may be many possible valid completions.
Parts of the sketch outside of the holes must remain unchanged in the output, while the synthesis engine may fill in the holes as it sees fit. This allows the programmer to provide a template for the structure of the program, and to constrain the search space as much or as little as desired. Loops are typically provided outside of holes in the sketch to avoid the intractability mentioned above.
More complex code may be synthesized by providing a grammar from which possible completions may be generated. Alternatives in the grammar are converted automatically into integer or boolean holes representing the choices made and then solved as before.
Diversity in Synthesis
It seems clear that diversity is naturally present, if not prevalent, in the problem of synthesizing code; in fact, oftentimes designers of synthesis systems devote great e↵ort toward hiding less-than-optimal solutions from users when selecting a final solution. The presumption is, of course, that users want to see only the best solution discovered by the algorithm.
To our knowledge, no prior work has applied program synthesis to the problem of artificial diversity. While security is occasionally mentioned in the synthesis literature, it tends to be limited to reverse-engineering and malware de-obfuscation applications [33, 40] and bug fixes [57] . Such applications still aim to produce a single program as output, and avoid methods that yield a plethora of solutions.
Evolutionary computation (EC) has recently been applied to fix security bugs in router firmware [64] . EC is not strictly the same as program synthesis, however there are similarities. While EC does create a diversity of mutants internally as part of the process of evolution, none of these candidate programs are viable for use since the algorithm terminates as soon as it finds one able to pass its regression tests. We believe that this and other non-synthesis search algorithms which operate on programs may also be able to be adapted as proposed in this paper to provide a diversity of (viable) outputs.
Multivariant or N-variant systems detect intrusions or faults by running a monitored diversity of semantically equivalent programs simultaneously [15] . Diversity in these systems is typically limited to primarily micro-diverse techniques (see Section 2.1.1). Richer sources of diversity, including our proposed approach, can therefore potentially benefit such approaches by supplying an automated source of more macrodiverse, yet semantically equivalent variants-perhaps with di↵erent intrusion detection capabilities.
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS

Rosette
For our preliminary experiments in applying synthesis to diversity, we chose the Rosette language [74, 75, 76] . Rosette provides synthesis, verification, and symbolic execution via solver-aided constructs; symbolic models are converted to integer constraint problems and solved with an SMT solver of the user's choice-Microsoft's Z3 [55] by default.
Rosette is embedded within Racket [18] , a functional language that is a successor to Scheme and Lisp. The availability of Racket within Rosette is particularly useful for our investigation because it provides many tools for extending the language's syntax and functionality, giving the developer the ability to create new programming languages or Domain Specific Languages (DSLs). The Rosette system provides two language dialects:
• a safe dialect (#lang rosette/safe), providing some of Racket's features, but omitting those which might interfere with the solver; and
• an unsafe dialect (#lang rosette), providing all of Racket's features.
These languages are designed to allow users to create their own DSLs with synthesis and verification capabilities built in. Rosette uses program sketching (see Section 3.2) to synthesize code. A library is provided that allows the user to specify a recursive grammar, or synthax (a portmanteau for "synthesizable syntax"). Synthax grammars are converted into binary symbolic variables that encode the grammar alternatives chosen by the synthesis engine.
A Simple Synthesis Example
As an example, 4 consider the following problem: given two machine registers (r1 and r2) and a pool of small program fragments, which we term gadgets [65] , construct a sequence of gadgets that stores the value 4 in register r1. While our use of the term gadget is inspired by o↵ensive security (returnoriented programming in particular), we use the term here in a more general sense: A gadget is any code fragment with known semantics.
First, we use Rosette's bitvector type to define a subtype with a given fixed precision, namely 8 bits. This new type will be used to model 8-bit registers:
#lang rosette/safe (define bitwidth 8) (define bv8? (bitvector bitwidth)) (define bv8-const (lambda (v) (bv v bitwidth)))
The #lang directive tells the Racket interpreter which language should be used to parse this module's source code. The bv8? predicate returns true (#t) if the argument is of our defined type, and bv8-const constructs a constant value in our defined type.
Next, we define symbolic variables to represent the registers. Here we use Rosette's symbolic execution, which lets us symbolically compute constraints on the possible values of each register after each step. Function define-symbolic creates a fresh symbolic value for each name given, with the final argument determining the type. Since each gadget destructively updates the value of the destination register, we save a copy of the unmodified symbolic value immediately after creation for later use. We also provide a reset function to restore the value of the registers to their original (unmodified) symbolic value.
; model 8-bit registers r1 and r2 (define-symbolic r1 r2 bv8?) 
; gadgets are side-effectful; ; use (reset) to clear them.
(define r1-symb r1) (define r2-symb r2) (define (reset) (set! r1 r1-symb) (set! r2 r2-symb))
Next, we define our gadget pool, and a helper function to execute a sequence of them. Here we use the bitvector operators provided by Rosette, whose names start with the prefix 'bv'. For example, bvshl performs a shift-left on bitvectors. While the gadgets presented here are each equivalent to a single instruction, this need not be the case in general. (We only show the implementation of a few gadgets; a full list is given in Table 1): ; G1: r1 *= 2 (define (g1) (set! r1 (bvshl r1 (bv8-const 1))))
; G2: r2 += 1 (define (g2) (set! r2 (bvadd r2 (bv8-const 1)))) . . .
; G5: r1 <-6 (define (g5) (set! r1 (bv8-const 6))) . . .
; G8: r2 <-r1 (define (g8) (set! r2 r1))
; given a gadget list, execute each in sequence.
(define (run-code code) (map (lambda (g) (g)) code))
Here, (run-code hgadget-listi) takes a list of gadgets and evaluates each gadget as a function, returning a list of results. This has the useful property of executing the side-e↵ects of each gadget in order.
Next, we define our desired goal for the synthesized program. We do this by asserting the desired properties using Rosette's assert function. This has two uses: when called with a proposition that uses concrete values, assert acts like an assert in a typical imperative programming language-if the proposition is false, it causes a runtime failure; otherwise execution continues with no e↵ect. If called on propositions containing symbolic values, Rosette adds the (symbolic)
proposition to a list of constraints to be checked next time the solver is exercised.
; GOAL: code that produces the result r1 = 4 (define (assert-correct) (assert (equal? r1 (bv8-const 4)))) (define (code-correct code) (reset) (run-code code) (assert-correct))
Function code-correct prescribes that a given gadget sequence is correct if, when executed after a reset (i.e., with any possible starting values in the registers), the desired property is true (namely that register r1 contains the value 4).
With this infrastructure in place, we're finally ready to synthesize some code. First, we use require to include a library for defining synthax. We then define gadget-sequence, a synthax grammar for generating a list of gadgets of given depth. The Rosette function choose creates a hole to be filled with any of the given expression alternatives. This definition encodes the following grammar:
We then define 5 synthesized-sequence, a sketch with a gadget-sequence hole. The sequence depth is passed as an argument.
6 Holes in the sketch determine the choice of gadgets and therefore the permutation of the sequence. ; a sketch with a hole, to be filled ; with gadget sequences of length 3 (define synthesized-sequence (gadget-sequence 2)) ; synthesize a correct gadget sequence: ; find a concrete model for the symbolic variables ; that satisfies all of our assertions (define soln (synthesize #:forall (list r1 r2) #:guarantee (code-correct synthesized-sequence))) (if (sat? soln) (print-forms soln) (display "Unsatisfiable"))
We then call synthesize to complete the sketch, asserting that our predicate code-correct must be true for the generated sequence. The result of synthesize defines a model assigning values to all symbolic variables except those given in the #:forall list. If the model is satisfiable, then the values in the model are used to complete the sketch, which synthesizes a particular gadget sequence. 5 At the time of this writing, sketch definitions must be saved to a file to generate completed sketches. 6 A depth of 0 produces a list containing 1 gadget. 
,G8,G7,G6,G8,G3,G3
Experimental Results
With the code shown, our program generates the sequence 7 G5, G3, G3, which assigns 6 to r1 and then subtracts 1 twice. This is indeed the shortest solution given the available gadgets. But what if we want a diversity of (possibly suboptimal) solutions? Can the synthesis algorithm discover them for us? One approach is to increase the requested depth of the generated sequence. After changing the depth from 2 to 3, Rosette instead discovers the sequence G5, G3, G8, G3, which assigns 6 to r1, subtracts 1, copies r1 to r2 (spuriously), and finally subtracts 1 again. This result goes to the heart of our observation about the nature of diversity in synthesis. We see that the new sequence is identical to our first answer, but with an additional copy gadget that acts as a semantic no-operation. The synthesis engine has thus discovered code insertion as an approach to the diversity problem.
Continuing the experiment by increasing the depth reveals more solutions of similar spirit. For example, Rosette's depth-4 solution is G5, G3, G3, G8, G8, which uses the semantic no-operation twice, this time both at the end. But what if we desire even greater diversity? Is there some way to encourage the search toward even more exotic regions of the search space without modifying the internals of the algorithm?
One potential way to do so is by randomly permuting the order of the gadget list o↵ered to the search engine. This capitalizes on the fact that search algorithms tend to consider the available choices in order, in the absence of any compelling reason to do otherwise. To test this, we changed the synthax definition slightly to put G6 before G5:
(define-synthax (gadget-sequence depth) #:base (list [choose g1 g2 g3 g4 g6 g5 g7 g8]) #:else (cons [choose g1 g2 g3 g4 g6 g5 g7 g8] (gadget-sequence (-depth 1))))
The new experimental results are reported in Table 2 . In the "Order" column, the value "A" indicates a result discovered using our original gadget order, "B" indicates one discovered using the permuted order, and "AB" indicates the same answer was arrived at by both versions. Our first new answer-at depth 3, consisting of G6, G2, G7, G1-assigns 1 to r2, adds 1, copies it to r1, and multiplies r1 by 2 to arrive at the answer 4. This shows that we can get significantly di↵erent answers with only a minor modification in the synthesis. The change in gadget order has changed the "shape" of the search space-the solver goes down paths generated by two di↵erent grammars which happen to generate the same language. We conjecture that similarly low-e↵ort adaptations of program synthesis tools could open an important new application area for this significant line of research, and o↵er far richer forms of artificial diversity than are presently achieved with ad hoc code obfuscation strategies.
Our small experiment can be seen as applicable to both o↵ensive and defensive security. Used for o↵ense, we can imagine this type of synthesis being used to generate equivalent but di↵erent malicious programs, which could reliably evade signature-based intrusion detection. While the limits of signature-based antivirus are already well-known (see Section 1), it is still regarded as useful for inoculating computers against the "background radiation" of the internet [63] prevelent yet unsophisticated attacks that threaten most users on a daily basis. But if unsophisticated attacks can be e↵ortlessly bred into highly diverse communities through program synthesis, even the unsophisticated attacks become highly threatening. In addition, prior work has observed that technologies that automate significant diversity can imbue malware with reactive capabilities-allowing software attacks to direct their mutations in order to penetrate specific defenses [25, 54] .
Conversely, if used as a defensive measure, this sort of code synthesis could be a way of automatically introducing artificial macro-diversity into a software population. Synthesis research has historically sought improved program development from scratch, and our experiments illustrate how it could also be applied to diversify already-developed programs in meaningful ways. Both modalities seem promising, in that they o↵er to leverage decades of powerful scientific advances in programming language theory toward improving the stateof-the-art in this notoriously di cult cyber security problem space.
WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS
We've tried to capture in this section key points discussed in the workshop, and clarify or address questions and topics brought up by NSPW participants.
Bugs and Security Flaws
Specification Problems
As mentioned in Section 1, both bugs and security flaws that are captured by the specification itself rather than the implementation will necessarily be present in all variants generated from that specification.
For example, when using sketching for code synthesis, any code outside of a hole in a sketch is reproduced exactly; errors in this part of the sketch will be retained in the final product. These parts of a sketch may be considered to be part of the specification (i.e., the parts of the program that are specified exactly). In particular, since control flow structure is likely to be outside of the holes in a sketch (as mentioned in Section 3.2), any control-flow vulnerabilities will necessarily be retained.
However, the fact that specifications may encode problems is not unique to sketching; specifications are always by defini-tion trusted, and any buggy formal specification will produce buggy results. Further, writing correct formal mathematical specifications may be seen in the development community as work requiring more highly trained professionals, and therefore as too costly an endeavor to undertake. The hope in the software synthesis community is that higher level specifications will be not only be clearer than traditional source code, but that the guarantee that any generated programs adhere to the specification provides its own reward.
Hole Complexity
When sketching, since holes are usually described by grammars, the possible contents of a filled in hole will always be exactly equal to the language generated by the grammar in question (as restricted by the assertions given). Thus, controlling the "size" or complexity of a hole is exactly equivalent to adjusting the grammar. The shape of this generated language exactly controls the search space and therefore the possible results produced in each variant.
Logistics
During a normal program development lifecycle, bugs (and to a lesser extent security issues) are found often and must be dealt with by the developers. Having di↵erent variants distributed to di↵erent end-users may complicate the process of finding and fixing errors.
Once a problem is discovered, the first task will be to determine whether the problem exists in all generated variants (and is therefore an error in the specification), or whether only one or a few variants exhibits the issue. In the former case, repairing the specification will fix the problem. Otherwise, several courses of action may be taken. The developer might:
• provide a patch specific to the erroneous variant(s);
• adjust the specification to prevent the error from ever being generated;
• do nothing; in some sense, statistically limiting security errors to a few variants is the goal of this work-having a limited number of deployments that could be exploited might be tolerable in some cases;
• blacklist the variant(s) in question: a mechanism or constraint could be added to the synthesis engine or specification to prevent emission of particular versions.
To assist with this a token uniquely determining the variant in question could be provided at generation time (e.g., numbers representing which grammar choices were made in each hole).
The tokens mentioned in the last point above would be useful not only in preventing the generation of particular variants during synthesis, but also in recreating them for debugging and testing purposes. However, if the synthesis algorithm and specification are both known to an attacker, care may have to be taken not to expose token values as well lest the attacker be able to recreate the version in use by a particular target.
A further logistical consideration is that of code signing: if signed code is desired, each variant would have to be signed by the code producer.
Stone Soup
Workshop participants brought to our attention a large body of work related to artificial diversity: the STONE-SOUP [28] project. The project concerns securely executing potentially untrusted programs; artificial diversity is a common technique used to achieve this goal. Example projects in this program include: MINESTRONE [36, 59] , PEASOUP [10] , and VIBRANCE [7, 11, 53] .
Hardware Diversification
It was mentioned in the workshop that diversification may be desirable not just at the software level, but at the hardware level as well. This is certainly possible; Rosette has been applied to synthesize circuit designs [75] in a hardware specification language, which could be diversified using the same techniques suggested in this paper.
Metrics
A metric for determining the degree of di↵erence between two generated programs would be useful to have, both for the synthesis algorithm (which might desire a minimum distance between subsequent outputs), and for program analysis. Such a metric would be hard to develop for the same reasons that program equivalence is a hard problem.
It should be noted that any metric for diversity would not be the same as a metric for security. Finding useful metrics for security has proved to be a di cult problem as well; however, future work might determine which security properties (if any) can be inferred from the degree of di↵erence between two program variants.
FUTURE WORK
Our preliminary exploration of synthesis for diversity raises many open research questions, which should be investigated by future work. We discuss several of these below, suggesting potential avenues of investigation.
Security properties of different synthesis techniques.
Synthesis algorithms are routinely evaluated in terms of accuracy and performance, but it would be valuable to additionally evaluate them from a security perspective (both defensively and o↵ensively). For example, some techniques may generate a larger number of more diverse programs when broadened to admit multiple solutions. Defensive evaluations should consider whether this variety educes resilience against attacks typically immune to artificial micro-diversity, while o↵ensive evaluations should measure its impact on antivirus detection rates. Trade-o↵s between diversity and runtime performance may also be an important consideration.
Meaningful evaluation must also take care to distinguish security from obscurity. Even if existing attacks and defenses fail against these more synthetically diverse software communities, we must carefully consider whether an attacker or defender with knowledge of the synthesis algorithm might be able to comprehensively adapt their methods to accommodate the diversity. For example, if synthesis for malware obfuscation yields populations with uniquely distinguishable structure, then small changes to malware signature databases will serve to easily mitigate the threat even if existing databases are inadequate. Similarly, if defensively synthesized software populations harbor new, yet predictable vulnerabilities, then we've merely replaced one monoculture with another.
Synthesis as an Arms Race.
Can synthesis technologies be turned backward to reverse any ostensible security benefits they o↵er? For example, could defenders observing a synthetically diverse malware population reliably infer the synthesis algorithm and its parameters, and use this information to reliably detect all members of the population? Dually, could attackers apply the same synthesis techniques used to harden a software population to instead craft attacks that succeed against it with high probability? We consider this an important question for understanding synthesis' role in the software security arms race. Answers may also lend insight into the following related problems:
1. Understanding malware intent: The capacity to derive general requirements and capabilities specifications from a subset of known variants of a given malware family has long been a holy grail of antivirus defense. Expediting such analyses through greater automation would grant defenders a significant advantage in the malware arms race.
Clustering similar malware:
The requirements specifications of di↵erent malware samples can be compared as an additional signal when determining malware similarity for the purposes of classification into families.
3. Generating new malware from existing samples: An o↵ensive use of reversible synthesis would be to generate requirements specifications from known malware families and to use them to generate diversified variants. This would be a powerful tool to a motivated attacker, as they could reuse the vast archives of malware that already exist to create newer, stealthier versions.
Specification-free Software.
Most widely deployed (and widely attacked) software products have no formal specification. Despite copious software engineering research underscoring its importance, formal specification remains an embarrassing omission in most software development lifecycles-even in products that find their way into mission-critical systems. Can program synthesis nevertheless diversify these specification-free products?
There is good reason to expect the answer might be a rmative. For example, program sketches-exhibited by our experiments in Section 4-are forms of specification that are relatively easy to derive from reference implementations (e.g., by replacing portions of the reference implementation with holes). Future research should therefore investigate the feasibility of leveraging these approaches to diversify legacy software.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we make the case for research that combines two expansive but as of yet separate fields of study-artificial diversity and automated program synthesis.
Artificial diversity allows di↵erent versions of a software to have identical semantics but di↵erent syntactic representations, and in doing so o↵ers a powerful tool that is used for both o↵ensive and defensive security.
Defensively it introduces uncertainty into a target binary that provides probabilistic guarantees against multiple classes of attacks. O↵ensively it provides a way for malware to evade detection.
Automated program synthesis attempts to systematically derive a program from a higher level specification. Many synthesis algorithms also allow formal assertions to be made about the correctness of the derived program with respect to its specification. However, existing literature on synthesis has not yet explored creating multiple variants from a single specification.
We use the Rosette language to perform some preliminary experiments towards the applicability of program synthesis to introduce diversity into a program population. The results show that there is indeed promise in this approach, and motivates the need for further research in this area.
There are multiple open questions that need to be answered before the utility of this approach can be accurately quantified, but we believe this also has the potential to improve both the o↵ensive and defensive state of the art.
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